

# Connectionist Semantic Systematicity in Language Production

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## Abstract

A novel connectionist model of sentence production is presented, which employs rich situation model representations originally proposed for modeling systematicity in comprehension (Frank, Haselager, & van Rooij, 2009). The high overall performance of our model demonstrates that such representations are not only suitable for comprehension, but also for modeling language production. Further, the model is able to produce novel encodings (active vs. passive) for a particular semantics, as well as generate such encodings for previously unseen situations, thus demonstrating both syntactic and semantic systematicity. Our results provide yet further evidence that such connectionist approaches can achieve systematicity, in production as well as comprehension.

**Keywords:** systematicity; sentence production; connectionist; semantics; syntax; neural networks

## Introduction

A defining characteristic of human language is systematicity: “the ability to produce/understand some sentences is intrinsically connected to the ability to produce/understand certain others” (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988, p. 37). Further, Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) argue that connectionist models are not able to display systematicity without implementing a classical symbol system.

The connectionist comprehension model developed by Frank et al. (2009), however, challenges this highly debated assertion, by developing a connectionist model of comprehension which is argued to achieve relevant levels of systematicity. Their model constructs a *situation model* (see Zwaan and Radvansky (1998)) of the state-of-affairs described by a sentence that also incorporates world knowledge-driven inferences. When the model processes a sentence like ‘a boy plays soccer’, for instance, it not only recovers the explicit, literal propositional content, but also constructs a more complete situation model in which a boy is likely playing outside on a field, with a ball, with others, and so forth. In this way it differs from other connectionist models of language comprehension and production, that typically employ simpler meaning representations, such as case-roles (Chang, Dell, & Bock, 2006; Mayberry, Crocker, & Knoeferle, 2009; Brouwer, 2014, among others). Crucially, Frank et al. (2009)’s model generalizes to both sentences and situations that it has not seen during training, exhibiting different levels of semantic systematicity and is argued to provide an important step in the direction of psychologically plausible models of language comprehension.

In the present paper, we examine whether the approach developed by Frank et al. (2009), is equally well suited to

language production, and present a connectionist production model that generates sentences from these rich situation models. We show that our model successfully learns to produce sentences from these rich meaning representations. Crucially, we demonstrate that this model is able to describe unseen situations, demonstrating semantic systematicity similar to Frank et al. (2009), as well as produce alternative encodings (e.g. active/passive) for a given situation, that were not seen during training and thus demonstrate syntactic systematicity.

## Method

We employ an extended Simple Recurrent Neural Network architecture (SRN) (Elman, 1990) to generate sentences from rich semantic representations, called Distributed Situation Space (DSS) vectors. The DSS model (Frank, Koppen, Noordman, & Vonk, 2003; Frank et al., 2009) is a distributed scheme for meaning, in which the meaning of a situation—a state of affairs—is represented as a *situation vector* in a high-dimensional “situation-state space”.

This section is organized as follows: first, we introduce the Distributed Situation Space as described by Frank et al. (2003, 2009); then, we explain the vectors that we use as well as the architecture of the model; afterwards the training and evaluation schema is presented; and finally we present the results obtained from the evaluation.

## Distributed Situation Space

The DSS model defines a microworld in terms of a finite set of *basic events* (e.g., *play(charlie, chess)* and *place(heidi, bedroom)*)—the smallest meaning-discerning units of propositional meaning in that world. While these basic events can be defined in several ways, we adopt the microworld presented by Frank et al. (2009). Situations in a microworld are represented in terms of these basic events, which can be conjoined to form *complex events* (e.g., *play(charlie, chess) ∧ win(charlie)*). Not all conjunctions of basic events are, however, possible or equally likely. That is, world knowledge can pose both hard (e.g., physical) and probabilistic (e.g., preferential) constraints on event co-occurrence. A situation-state space is a large set of  $m$  situations defined in terms of  $n$  basic events, effectively yielding an  $m \times n$  matrix (see Table 1). Each of the  $m$  situations in this matrix is encoded by setting basic events that *are the case* in a given situation to 1 (True) and those that are not to 0 (False). A situation-state space matrix is constructed by sampling  $m$  situations (using a non-deterministic sampling proce-

Table 1: Situation-state space.

	basic event <sub>1</sub>	basic event <sub>2</sub>	basic event <sub>3</sub>	...	basic event <sub>n</sub>
situation <sub>1</sub>	1	0	0	...	1
situation <sub>2</sub>	0	1	1	...	1
situation <sub>3</sub>	1	1	0	...	0
...	.	.	.	...	.
situation <sub>m</sub>	0	1	0	...	0

ture) such that no situation violates any hard world knowledge constraints, and such that the  $m$  situations approximate the probabilistic nature of the microworld in terms of the (co-)occurrence probability of the  $n$  basic events. The resulting situation-state space matrix is then effectively one big truth table, in which each column represents the *situation vector* for an individual basic event; that is, each column of the matrix encodes the meaning of a basic event in terms of its co-occurrence with all other basic events. The situation vectors of complex events (combinations of basic events) can be found through propositional logic, allowing to capture phenomena such as negation, conjunction and disjunction; conversely, complex events also allow us to capture aspects of modality and quantification.

This situation-state space encodes *all* knowledge about the microworld, and situation vectors capture dependencies between situations in this space, thereby allowing for ‘world knowledge’-driven inference.

DSS representations have been successfully used in a connectionist comprehension model (Frank et al., 2009). That is, Frank et al. (2009) defined a small *microworld* (see section two of their paper), consisting of 44 basic events, centred around three people, and a few games, toys, and places. They constructed a situation-state space by sampling 25,000 situations in this microworld, and reduced the dimensionality of the resulting  $25k$ -dimensional situation vectors to 150-dimensions using a competitive layer algorithm. Using these reduced vectors, they show that their model is not only able to comprehend sentences that it has seen during training, but that is also able to comprehend sentences and situations that it has never seen before (i.e., it shows semantic systematicity).

The vectors that we use for production are slightly different. Namely, the dimensionality of the situation-space was not reduced, since its reduction involves some loss of information. Rather, for each  $25k$ -dimensional situation vector associated to a particular sentence, which in turn is associated to a (complex) event; we compute a *belief situation vector*, whose dimensionality is equal to the number of basic events in the microworld (44 in this case) and the value of each dimension is equal to the conditional probability of the corresponding basic event, given the (complex) event associated

to the sentence.<sup>1</sup> In other words, each dimension represents how likely each basic event is to be true, given the situation that is expressed by the sentence.

## The Model

Our model architecture, as we can see in Figure 1, is broadly similar to the one used by Frank et al. (2009), with the main difference being that the inputs and outputs are reversed; it maps DSS representations onto sequences of localist word representations. Similar to Frank et al. (2009), we stress that it is not intended to model human language development.

The model consists of a 45-unit input layer, a 120-unit recurrent hidden (tanh) layer, and a 43 unit (softmax) output layer. The dimensionality of the input layer corresponds to the 44 basic events in the microworld, plus one extra binary unit that indicates whether the model must output an active sentence (1), or a passive one (0). The dimensionality of the output layer matches the number of available words in the grammar (42), plus the end-of-sentence marker.

Time in the model is discrete. At each time-step  $t$ , activation propagates forward following the trajectory: input  $\rightarrow$  hidden  $\rightarrow$  output. The activation of the output layer yields a probability distribution over the available words. We define the word produced at time-step  $t$  as the one with highest probability (highest activation). The model stops producing words when an end-of-sentence marker has been produced.

The hidden layer also receives a copy of its own activation pattern at the previous time-step  $t - 1$ , through a 120-unit context layer, which is set to zero at the beginning of each sentence. These units help to preserve some memory of what has been produced expanding several time steps in the past, and allow the model to generate sentences of variable length.

In addition, the hidden layer receives the identity of the word that was produced at time-step  $t - 1$  (zeros at  $t = 0$ ) through *monitoring units* that connect the output layer to the hidden layer, where only the output unit corresponding to the produced word at time-step  $t - 1$  is activated (set to 1), while all other units are set to 0.

Finally, the hidden and output layers also receive input from a bias unit (with a constant activation value of 1).

## Examples Set

The examples set consists of a set of pairs  $\{(DSS_1, \varphi_1), \dots, (DSS_n, \varphi_n)\}$  where each  $DSS_i \in [0, 1]^{45}$  corresponds to a DSS representation plus an extra bit indicating whether the system must produce an active sentence (1) or a passive one (0); and  $\varphi_i = \{sent_1, \dots, sent_k\}$  where  $sent_j$  is a sentence, a sequence of words  $word_1, \dots, word_n$ , expressing the information contained in  $DSS_i$ . Each set  $\varphi_i$  represents all the possible sentences that express the

<sup>1</sup>This vector is computed by calculating the dot product between the situation-state matrix and the original  $25k$ -dimensional situation vector, and then normalizing each dimension of the resulting vector by the sum over the dimensions of the original  $25k$ -dimensional situation vector.




Figure 1: Model architecture.

information contained in the corresponding *DSS*; and in the expected voice.

The sentences that we use are those generated by the microlanguage defined by Frank et al. (2009) (see their Tables 5–8). This microlanguage consists of 40 words that can be combined into 13556 sentences according to its grammar. We minimally modified this grammar. First, we introduced the determiners that were missing (a, the); and second, we added an end-of-sentence marker (a period) to the sentences. Leaving a total of 43 words that were encoded at the output layer as localist vectors.

Sentences that expressed unlawful situations according to the microworld rules, and therefore whose *DSS* belief vectors were empty, were discarded; leaving a total of 8201 lawful sentences. From these, 6782 sentences were in active voice and 1419 in passive. Note that this set contains sentences with simple semantics (e.g., “charlie plays chess.” → *play(charlie, chess)*), as well as sentences with complex semantics (e.g., “a girl plays chess.” → *play(heidi, chess) ∨ play(sophia, chess)*).

There were a total of 782 unique *DSS* representations, from which 424 were related to both passive and active sentences. The rest (358) corresponded to situations that could only be expressed by active sentences according to the grammar. More concretely, the grammar presented in Frank et al. (2009) does not define passive sentences for situations where the object of the action is either a person (e.g. “Heidi beats Charlie.”) or undefined (e.g. “Charlie plays.”).

## Training and Evaluation

In order to assess the performance of the model in terms of accuracy and generalization, we employed a 10-fold cross-validation schema. First, we divided the *DSS* representations into two sets: the first one (setAP) corresponding to those associated to both active and passive sentences and the second one (setA) corresponding to *DSS* representations that were related only to active sentences.

The first set (setAP) allowed for three different testing conditions:

- **Condition 1:** Situations for which the model has seen only active sentences, and a passive is queried.
- **Condition 2:** Situations for which the model has seen only passive sentences, and an active is queried.
- **Condition 3:** Completely new situations (not seen during training), passive and active sentences are queried.

The second set (setA) allowed for two different testing conditions:

- **Condition 4:** Situations for which the model has seen only active sentences, and a passive is queried.
- **Condition 5:** Completely new situations (not seen during training), passive and active sentences are queried.

These conditions represent different levels of generalization or systematicity. In all cases, the queried sentence type has never been seen by the model. For conditions 1, 2 and 4 the model has seen the situation but not in the queried voice. Importantly, for conditions 3 and 5, the model has never seen the situation itself. Finally, for conditions 4 and 5, where passives are queried, not only the system has not seen the passive sentences, but also they are not defined by the grammar.

SetAP was randomly shuffled and split into 10 folds of 90% training and 10% testing *DSS* representations, meaning per fold 382 training and 42 testing situations. For each fold, the testing *DSS* representations were further split into the 3 conditions, rendering 14 different testing *DSS* representations per condition, per fold.

SetA was also shuffled and split into 10 folds, but in order to preserve uniformity, for each fold and for testing, 14 *DSS* representations were drawn per condition; meaning that each fold contained 28 testing and 330 training *DSS* representations.

Finally, for condition 1 the *DSS* representations were coupled with their corresponding active sentences and incorporated into the training set (while the passive sentences remained in the testing set); vice-versa for condition 2. Similarly, for condition 4 the active sentences were incorporated into the training set, while during testing the system will be queried for a passive construction, even though there is none according to the grammar.

**Training Procedure** We trained the model using cross-entropy backpropagation (Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986) with weight updates after each word in the sentence of each training item. Prior to training, all weights on the projections between layers were initialized with random values drawn from a normal distribution  $\mathcal{N}(0, 0.1)$ . The weights on the bias projections were initially set to zero.

During training, the monitoring units were set at time  $t$  to what the model was supposed to produce at time  $t - 1$  (zeros for  $t = 0$ ). This reflects the notion that during training the word contained in the training sentence at time-step  $t - 1$  should be the one informing the next time step, regardless of

Table 2: Similarity scores for each test condition.

Cond.	Query	Similarity (%)	PerfectMatch (%)
1	pas	97.66	87.86
2	act	97.58	92.86
3	act	98.35	93.57
3	pas	96.79	83.57
5	act	95.08	85.0

the previously produced (and possibly different) word. During testing, the monitoring units are set to 1.0 for the word that was actually produced and 0.0 everywhere else.

The model was trained for a maximum of 200 epochs, each epoch consisting of a full presentation of the training set, which was randomized before each epoch. Note that each item of this set consisted of a  $DSS_i$  paired with one of the possible sentence realizations describing the state of affairs represented in  $DSS_i$ . Hence, during each epoch, the model saw all the possible realizations of  $DSS_i$  contained in the training set for a given fold. We employed an initial learning rate of 0.124 which was halved each time there was no improvement of performance on the training set during 15 epochs. No momentum was used. Training halted if the maximum number of epochs was reached or if there was no performance improvement on the training set over a 40-epoch interval.

**Sentence Level Evaluation** For a given DSS representation  $DSS_i$ , the model produces a sequence of words  $\hat{s}_i$  constituting a sentence describing the state-of-affairs represented in  $DSS_i$ . Because a  $DSS_i$  can be described by one or more sentence(s), we assume that the output of the model is perfect if the sentence produced  $\hat{s}_i$  is part of the set  $\varphi_i$  of all possible realizations of  $DSS_i$  in the queried voice.

However, sometimes the output of the model  $\hat{s}_i$  for a  $DSS_i$  does not perfectly match any of the sentences in  $\varphi_i$ . As such, we also compute the similarity between the output of the model  $\hat{s}_i$ , and each sentence in  $\varphi_i$ . This similarity is derived from their Levenshtein distance (Levenshtein, 1966); which is the number of insertions, deletions or substitutions that are needed in order to transform one string into another. More formally, Levenshtein similarity  $sim(s_1, s_2)$  between two sentences  $s_1$  and  $s_2$  is defined as:

$$sim(s_1, s_2) = 1 - \frac{distance(s_1, s_2)}{\max(length(s_1), length(s_2))} \quad (1)$$

where  $distance$  is the Levenshtein distance. This similarity measure is 0 when the sentences are completely different and 1 when they are the same. Thus, for each item  $i$  in the training and test set, we obtain a similarity value:

$$sim(\hat{s}_i) = \max_{s \in \varphi_i} sim(\hat{s}_i, s) \quad (2)$$

## Results

We trained 10 instances of the model, corresponding to each fold as described above. Each instance was initialized with a

different set of weight matrices. The scores reported below are averaged over these instances.

On the training set, the model achieved an average similarity score of 99.43% (and 98.23% perfect matches). This shows that the model is able to learn to transform a DSS situation vector into a sequence of words describing the state-of-affairs that the vector represents.

Regarding the test conditions, Table 2 shows the average similarity scores for each of them. For conditions 4 and 5, where passives are queried but there are no example sentences given by the grammar, no similarity scores can be computed and in exchange a qualitative analysis will be presented.

We can notice a slight drop of similarity scores for condition 5. This could be explained because setA in general contained fewer sentences per DSS, and thus fewer training items.

The average similarity score across all conditions is of 97.1%, with 88.57% of perfect matches. This translates into roughly one to three mistakes per condition and per fold. The nature of these mistakes is addressed in the next section, however we can observe that the performance in terms of similarity is very high and almost perfect in several cases.

**Qualitative Analysis** Although the performance is quite high, the model elicits a number of systematic mistakes that provides us with some insight into the internal mechanism that is implemented by the network. Examples of these are shown in Table 3.

Taking a qualitative look into the produced sentences, it is evident that, with literally a couple of exceptions, all the sentences produced are syntactically correct and semantically felicitous. The vast majority of the elicited mistakes occur when the model produces a sentence that is semantically highly similar to the one expected. This pattern can be seen already during training, where the mistakes correspond to situations that are closely related, so the model is unable to distinguish them, even though it has already seen the situations/sentences (examples 1-3 in Table 3).

For the conditions shown in Table 2, the errors elicited during 5 folds were manually inspected in order to see their regularities. The errors observed (38 in total) can be classified into 2 main categories: the first one (63.2%) being errors concerning over and underspecification, and the second one (31.6%) corresponding to situations that because of the design of the microworld are remarkably similar, differing only in one aspect.

Concerning the first category, the errors can be further split into **location** under- (21.05%) and over- (7.9%) specification (examples 4-5 in Table 3), **subject** under- (15.8%) and over- (10.5%) specification (examples 6-7 in Table 3), and **object** under- (2.6%) and over- (5.2%) specification (examples 8-9 in Table 3).

The errors contained in the second category (examples 10-12 in Table 3) correspond to sentences that at first glance seem correct, it is only after taking a deep look into the microworld that one can see the mistake. First, according to this

Table 3: Examples of representative output errors.

	<b>Output</b>	<b>Expected</b>
1	someone plays with a ball outside .	a girl plays with a ball outside .
2	someone loses in the bedroom .	someone wins in the bedroom .
3	a girl loses to someone in the bedroom .	someone beats a girl at a game in the bedroom .
4	Sophia beats Heidi with ease at hide_and_seek .	Sophia beats Heidi with ease at hide_and_seek in the bedroom .
5	Sophia wins with ease at a game in the street .	Sophia wins with ease at a game outside .
6	a girl plays with a doll inside .	Heidi plays with a doll inside .
7	a game is won with ease by a girl in the bathroom .	a game is won with ease by someone in the bathroom .
8	someone plays .	someone plays with a toy .
9	Charlie plays a game in the street .	Charlie plays in the street .
10	someone wins in the bedroom at hide_and_seek .	someone loses in the bedroom at hide_and_seek .
11	Heidi loses to someone in the bedroom at hide_and_seek .	someone beats Heidi in the bedroom at hide_and_seek .
12	Sophia beats someone at hide_and_seek in the bedroom .	someone loses to Sophia at hide_and_seek in the bedroom .

microworld, whenever there is a winner, there is also a loser, which means that sentences that are apparently contradictory (“someone loses.” vs “someone wins.”) actually have the same implications within the microworld and therefore are semantically identical. Second, in general whenever there is a winner/loser, the loser is usually situated in the same location as the winner. However, only for the game `hide_and_seek` and when the participants are inside, the loser can be in the bedroom, while the winner could be in the bathroom, or vice-versa. Finally, whenever there is a prepositional phrase (“in the bedroom”), it is attached to the subject of the sentence according to the grammar, which means that in “Heidi beats Sophie in the bedroom”, Heidi is in the bedroom while Sophie could be in either the bedroom or the bathroom, while in “Sophie loses to Heidi in the bedroom”, it is Sophie who stays in the bedroom while Heidi could also be in the bathroom. Apart from this detail, the situations are almost identical.

According to the errors so far analyzed, we can conclude that the nature of these is primarily related to situations that are highly similar.

With regard to the test conditions 4 and 5 where a passive sentence is queried but the grammar does not properly define its characterization, Table 4 presents examples of output sentences and the situations that they were supposed to portray. As mentioned before, these situations can be of two types: the first one involving a winning/losing situation where both actors are explicitly mentioned, and the second type being situations where the object of the action is not defined. We took also a closer look into the output of the model for these conditions by manually making an analysis of the output of 3 folds (84 situations), whose results we will now present.

Even though in condition 4 the model has not seen the type sentences that are queried, and that in condition 5 the model has no experience with the queried situations, the sentences produced by the model are mostly correct and coherent with the semantic information that is given to it. One can see that some information is omitted, however, this is expected since the grammar itself does not contain rules that allow to fully encode these situations.

In general, the model learns during training that passive sentences always start by mentioning the object of the action,

and that this object is never a person. Therefore, for each situation it tries first to find this object and then it tries to describe the rest of the situation.

Concerning winning/losing situations (examples 1-2 in Table 4), which conform 92.9% of the analyzed situations, the object is always a game because in the microworld winning/losing can only happen while playing a game. Thus, the model produces the specific name of the game when it is known (e.g. “soccer is...”), otherwise the sentence starts with “a game is...”. Then one of the players is mentioned (one omitted) and the rest of the situation is portrayed.

For the case of situations with an underspecified object (7.1%, examples 3-4 in Table 4), it is unknown whether the subject is playing a game or with a toy, so the model is forced to choose one. In all cases the model chooses a toy, which seems reasonable because mostly the DSS representations of the underspecified sentences are more similar to situations where a toy is played with. For example, the DSS representation of “someone plays.” is more similar to the one of “someone plays with a toy.” (99.36% cosine similarity) than to the representation of “someone plays a game.” (97.73% cosine similarity).

Similar to the other conditions, errors regarding over and underspecification occur in conditions 4 and 5, but are rare (example 5 in Table 4). And finally one type of error that appears only for these situations corresponds to the interchange of the winner/loser in game situations (example 6 in Table 4).

In sum, one can see from the output that the model is able to take the linguistic elements learned during training in order to characterize situations for which it has no experience, while being as informative as possible. The only difficulty appears to be the distinction of situations that are highly similar. However, the performance of the model is very high in general and even for the sentences that do present a mistake, the output is largely correct.

## Discussion

The model learns to generate sentences from rich situation representations, and furthermore, it generalizes to novel sentences and situations.

We can see that the model is able to learn the syntactic

Table 4: Examples of passive output sentences for situations with no passive examples.

	Output	Active Sentence
1	hide_and_seek is won with ease by Heidi in the playground .	Heidi beats Sophia with ease in the playground at hide_and_seek .
2	a game is won with ease by Sophia .	Sophia beats Charlie with ease .
3	a toy is played with .	someone plays .
4	a toy is played with in the playground by Sophia .	Sophia plays in the playground .
5	a game is lost with difficulty by Charlie .	a girl beats Charlie with difficulty in the street .
6	chess is lost by Heidi in the bedroom .	the boy loses to Heidi at chess in the bedroom .

patterns of the microworld and does not just memorize sentences, thus showing *syntactic* generalization. This was observed in all test conditions, where the model was capable of producing sentences that it had never seen before. This means that the model is able to generate new combinations of words in such a way that the new combinations are in order with the syntactic rules of the grammar associated to the microworld, while at the same time being coherent with the semantic structures to which they are related.

Crucially, the model also generalizes *semantically*, as demonstrated in test conditions 3 and 5, since the semantic representations given to the model are completely novel to it, so any correct output can be regarded as arising from the regularities within the microworld from which the DSS representations are derived—cf. the comprehension results by Frank et al. (2009).

We hypothesize that the fact that the model has difficulties with highly similar situations means that the model is able to roughly reconstruct the topography of the microworld semantic space, putting together situations that are semantically related. At the same time, the model assigns linguistic structures to each area in this semantic space such that semantically similar situations are assigned linguistically similar realizations. Given that in practice the semantic space is a continuous 44-dimensional space, in theory the model should be able to generate sentences for unseen areas as long as it is given enough information during training in order to reconstruct the semantic space and the mapping between semantics and linguistic realizations, as proposed by Frank et al. (2009).

The results of the test conditions show that it is indeed the case. Conditions 3 and 5 demonstrated that the model is able to generate sentences for unseen areas in the semantic space, therefore showing semantic systematicity. Conditions 1 and 2 demonstrated that the model is able to generate sentences for semantically known situations but with a different voice (active/passive), showing syntactic systematicity. Conditions 4 and 5, where passive sentences are queried, demonstrated that it is able to produce coherent sentences even if the grammar that was used to construct the training/testing sets does not associate passive constructions with these situations.

As it is now, the semantic space related to the microworld that we use is finite, however we were able to show different levels of systematicity for unknown areas of this space, which was our main objective. In principle, the microworld can be extended by adding elements to the set of basic events, and words to its vocabulary.

## Conclusion

We presented a novel connectionist model of sentence production that uses the rich semantic representations described in Frank et al. (2009). This model is able to take such representations and produce sentences that accurately describe the associated situations. The model is also able to produce alternative encodings (e.g. active vs. passive) for a particular semantics, showing an overall high performance and demonstrating that these semantic representations are not only suitable for comprehension, but also for modeling language production. And furthermore, the model is able to generate novel sentences for previously unseen situations, thus demonstrating syntactic and semantic systematicity.

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